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This  paper  reviews  the  system  for  social  cash  transfers  in  Namibia,  a  middle-
income country with a long experience in making available a universal and non-
contributory  old  age  pension,  child  grants  using  means-testing  and  quasi-
conditionalities and other cash transfers. The paper traces the origins of the cash 
transfers back to the country’s past annexation into apartheid South Africa and 
shows how Namibia’s system is now faced with a set of distinct challenges that 
are particularly pertinent as the authorities are rapidly scaling-up access. Notably, 
in the years after the remaining elements of racial discrimination were eliminated, 
and  the  value  of  the  transfers  were  equalised  across  the  ethnic  groups,  new 
discrepancies  have  developed  in  the  values  of  the  different  grants.  Moreover, 
using newly available household data the paper finds inefficiencies in the means-
testing for the child grants – especially when compared to South Africa. In spite 
of these challenges the paper also shows that social cash transfers have a large 
effect on poverty reduction and that the effects are particularly positive for the 
poorest of the poor. The transfers also tend to reduce inequality but this impact is 
more limited. Simulations indicate the fiscal sustainability of an expanded system 
of social cash transfers and highlight the potential cost-savings that would accrue 
from a more effective means-test of the child grants. In the analysis the effects of 






Keywords: Namibia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Social protection, Social transfers, Old 
age pension, Disability grants, Child grants 
JEL codes: H55,  O1 
 
 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements: This paper was prepared for the Central Bureau of Statistics in Windhoek. We 
are grateful to the Bureau for access to the data and for guidance in interpretation and methodology. 
We are also grateful for administrative data and helpful information on the systems of social transfers 
from Ministries of Gender Equality and Child Welfare, of Labour and Social Services, and of Veterans 
Affairs, and the Office of the Prime Minister. Fabio Veras Soares provided helpful comments on an 
earlier version of the paper as did participants at the Poverty Reduction, Equity and Growth Network 
Conference on "Policies for Reducing Inequality in the Developing World“ 3-4 September 2009 
Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors 
and not the organisations they work for nor the Central Bureau of Statistics.  
- 2 - 
 
1.      Introduction 
There is growing focus in developing countries on the role of social protection programmes in 
general and cash transfers in particular towards reducing poverty and meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals. In sub-Saharan Africa, where progress towards the global poverty goals has 
been particularly slow, the African Union has called on member states to: make social transfers 
“a  more  utilised  policy  option”,  integrate  costed  programmes  into  national  budgets  and 
development  plans,  and  share  information  and  experiences  across  countries  (African  Union 
2006: 2). Namibia‟s experiences are particularly relevant as it is one of just a few countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa with a long history of state provision of cash transfers to needy population 
groups. This is linked to the country‟s past annexation into South Africa, whose programmes for 
social protection have been described extensively (Devereux 2007; van der Berg 1997; Lund 
1993). However, even if the programmes for social protection in the two countries share their 
point of origin and many common features remain, in several aspects they have developed quite 
differently and the system in Namibia is faced with a set of distinct challenges.  
 
Some  analysis  has  already  been  conducted  into  specific  areas  of  Namibia‟s  system  of  cash 
transfers (Schleberger 2002; Devereux 2001; Subbarao 1998; Morgan 1991) and Namibia has 
featured in a number of multi-country comparisons (Devereux 2007; Standing 2007; Johnson and 
Williamson 2006; Fultz and Pieris 1999). However, important gaps remain in this literature. 
Firstly,  most  of  these  studies  focus  almost  exclusively  on  Namibia‟s  state  pensions  for  the 
elderly  while  little  research  has  been  conducted  into  other  important  aspects  of  the  social 
protection system, notably the country‟s child grants and the grants for veterans of the liberation 
struggle, both of which are of growing importance. Secondly, a comprehensive analysis of the 
impact of cash transfers, including the pensions, on household welfare has so far been lacking 
due to a lack of nationally representative primary data. Thirdly, and also as a result of data 
limitations, little analysis has been done to assess the effectiveness of existing mechanisms for 
targeting social cash transfers towards the poorest. By drawing on newly available household 
survey data, albeit still with some limitations, this study begins to fill these gaps and presents an 
empirical analysis of one of the oldest and most comprehensive cash transfer systems in sub-
Saharan Africa. This analysis should provide useful guidance for policy makers in Namibia as 
they explore the options for scaling-up access to transfers and for reforming the current system.  
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It  should  also  be  of  interest  beyond  Namibia‟s  borders  as  the  continent  moves  towards  an 
expanded social policy agenda. 
 
The paper is organised in seven sections. Section 2 next provides a brief overview of the socio-
economic  context  within  which  the  social  protection  system  should  be  assessed.  Section  3 
presents the social protection system in Namibia, its history and the evolution of the cash transfer 
programmes  and  current  coverage.  Section  4  introduces  the  data  and  methodology  of  the 
empirical analysis on the impact on poverty and inequality of the cash transfer and Section 5 
presents  the  results  from  the  empirical  analysis  on  the  distributive  impact  of  the  grants.  In 
Section 6 a range of policy options and reform issues is discussed before Section 7 concludes.   
 
 
2.      Background 
Namibia is classified by the World Bank as a „lower middle income country‟ with a per capita 
GDP of US$ 2,100, which is almost four times the average for sub-Saharan Africa.
2 However, 
because of extreme levels of inequality, large pockets of poverty and one of the most severe 
HIV/AIDS epidemics in the world, average income is a particularly deceptive measure of the 
welfare in Namibia. Today‟s development challenges reflect a combination of factors including 
the enduring legacy of the country‟s recent colonial and apartheid past, unique geo-physical 
features, demographic changes and public policy choices. 
 
Formerly South West Africa, Namibia was colonised by Germany in 1884 and after World War I 
it came under South African administration first on a League of Nation‟s mandate and hence 
illegitimately annexed into South Africa until Independence in 1990. As in the apartheid-state of 
South Africa, the policies of separate development meant that the small white settler population 
of European descent (backed by Pretoria) controlled the economy as well as the political order, 
while the majority of the population lived in abject poverty (Tapscott 1993). In 1989 the settler 
community and the small black elite that had emerged under the interim governments after 1978 
comprised just 5 percent of the population but were estimated to account for 71 percent of the 
                                                 
2 World Development Indicators (accessed January 2009).  
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GDP. In contrast, the bottom 55 percent of the population accounted for just 3 percent of the 
GDP (United Nations 1989, reported in UNICEF 1991). As will be explored further below, these 
extreme levels of inequality persist to the present day.  
 
The population of around 2 million inhabit a country of 824,269 sq km, which gives Namibia 
one of the lowest population densities in the world (United Nations 2004). This is mainly due to 
the fact that a large part of the country is too dry for human settlement, because of low and 
highly variable rainfall. Two thirds of the population live in rural areas and predominantly in the 
northern  regions  (Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  2003).  These  regions  are  characterised  by 
communal land ownership, high levels of poverty and food insecurity, and poor coverage of 
economic and social infrastructure.  
 
What Namibia‟s population may lack in size it makes up for in diversity with 11 ethnic groups 
officially  recognized  and  about  30  different  Bantu,  Khoisan  and  Indo-European  languages 
spoken  (Maho  1998).  The  policies  of  apartheid  served  to  reify  racial  and  ethnic  divisions 
throughout the society, to the extent that different communities were segregated geographically, 
economically  and  socially  (Tapscott  1993).  After  Independence,  Article  10  of  the  new 
constitution entrenched equality and freedom from discrimination as basic rights of citizenship. 
Since then, principles of affirmative action towards “historically disadvantaged groups” have 
guided government policies in areas such as employment and land redistribution, although a 
comprehensive policy is still to be prepared. 
 
Growth in GDP averaged 4.3 percent in the decade 1997-2006 and 1.8 percent in per capita 
terms (Central Bureau of Statistics 2007), which is higher than for most other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. It is also a reversal compared to years of contraction and instability prior to 1990 
(see  Figure  1).  At  Independence  Namibia  inherited  a  labour  market  that  was  segmented 
according to ethnicity in access to employment opportunities and wages.  Oscillating internal 
labour migration, mainly of males from the northern regions based on a system of contracts and 
the notorious pass-laws was entrenched to ensure that the white-dominated industries, notably 
mining and commercial farms, had the needed number of labourers, that surplus labour was kept 
out of the areas designated for whites while wages were kept low. After Independence patterns of  
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migration have persisted driven largely by employment opportunities in the commercial centre of 
Windhoek, the mining areas and the coastal fisheries industry. However, overall job creation has 
been slow.  
Figure 1: Growth and inflation in Namibia, 1980-2007 
 
Source: Data provided by Central Bureau of Statistics  
 
The broad rate of unemployment, which includes discouraged job-seekers, reached 37 percent in 
2004 but unemployment rates are even higher among women and the growing number of youth 
(Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 2006). With limited prospects for employment it is no 
surprise that the labour force participation rate fell over the period, especially among those 60-64 
years and 65+  years, where  the  rates  fell from 43 to  23 percent  and from 33 to  7 percent, 
respectively (Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare 2006, 2004).
3  
                                                 
3 It is not clear whether the increase in the value of the old-age pension and the lowering of the pension age for men 
from 65 years to 60 years to bring it into line with that of women (discussed more later) may have played a role in 








1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Annual change in GDP per cap Annual change in Consumer Price Index
1990:Year of Namibian Independence 
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Namibia is among the countries in the world that spend the highest share of GDP on education 
and health (United Nations 2004). Nevertheless, it has proven difficult for the Government to 
reverse  the  effects  of  severe  under-investments  in  social  services  for  the  majority  of  the 
population during the years of colonial rule. Moreover, health and other human development 
outcomes are severely affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Among pregnant women tested at 
ante-natal clinics around 20 percent are infected with HIV, and AIDS-related illness has been the 
leading cause of death for more than a decade (United Nations 2004). Health indicators such as 
life  expectancy,  under-five  mortality  and  maternal  mortality  have  deteriorated  over  the  past 
decades although in recent years a relatively successful anti-retroviral treatment programme has 
been rolled out (Ministry of Health and Social Services 2008). The cumulative impact of the 
AIDS epidemic has been a surge in the number of orphans and the total number of children 
under 15 who have lost one or both parents is projected to reach 180,000 by 2010 (United 
Nations 2004).  
 
 
3.  Social cash transfers in Namibia 
There  exists  a  range  of  social  protection  mechanisms  in  Namibia  ranging  from  informal 
arrangements based on sharing within and between families and communities to a variety of 
formal  and  publicly  funded  programmes.
4  Contributory  pensions schemes linked to formal 
employment include those of the Government Institutions Pension Fund (GIPF) for civil servants 
and the Social Security Commission (SCC) for those employed in the private sector. Benefits 
under SCC include maternity and sick leave, death benefits, pension and medical aid funds, and 
special funds for development of training and employment schemes ,  and compensation for 
injuries and accidents.  Examples of informal  arrangement for social protection  include family 
extensions, gifts and sharing of food and other necessities,  and interest free loans from relatives 
and neighbours. These arrangements are particularly important , but also  ultimately  deemed 
insufficient given high levels of income poverty especially in rural areas, increased mortality and 
morbidity as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, high levels of migration from rural to urban 
                                                 
4 Following United Nations (2000: 3) social protection is “broadly understood as a set of public and private policies 
and programmes undertaken by societies in response to various contingencies in order to offset the absence or 
substantial reduction of income from work; provide assistance to families with children; and provide people with 
health care and housing.”  
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areas in pursuit of formal sector jobs, and food insecurity (Subbarao 1998; Devereux and Naeraa 
1996).  
 
Like many other developing countries Namibia also has in place labour-based work programmes, 
food distribution in times of humanitarian crises such as the frequent droughts or floods, and an 
expanding school-feeding programme. However, Namibia stands out among countries in sub-
Saharan Africa for its long tradition in making available a universal and non-contributory state 
pension  as  well  as  (quasi-)conditional  and  means-tested  child  grants.
5  The system of  cash 
transfers in the form of social pensions and grants was inherited from South Africa, where it was 
initially set up to protect the “white” population but gradually expanded to cover the whole 
population making it probably the most comprehensive in the developing world (Lund 1993). 
The  fact  that  the  seeds  for  these  trappings  of  a  welfare  state  were  planted  under  a  system 
otherwise known for its racial inequalities and discriminatory social polices is not without irony 
(Van der Berg 1997). The main features of the different types of social cash transfers in Namibia 
are summarised in Table 1. The remainder of this section provides further details of the social 
pensions and child grants, which are the main focus of this paper.  
 
3.1 Social pensions 
There are three types of non-contributory social pensions in Namibia. First, the Old Age Pension 
(OAP), which is paid to everyone who reaches 60 years of age, irrespective of past and current 
employment status and income, as long as the person is a Namibian citizen or permanent resident 
and  is  residing  in  Namibia.  The  universality  of  the  pension  sets  it  apart  from  most  other 
countries, including South Africa where the state pension is means tested (as discussed further 
below). In the budget for 2008/2009 the monthly value of the pension was raised from N$380 to 
N$450.
6 The second social pension is the Disability Pension (DP), which has the same value as 
the OAP and is paid to those 16 years and above who have been diagnosed by a State doctor as 
being  temporarily  or  permanently  disabled.  Blind  people  and  people  who  are  medically 
diagnosed with AIDS are also included.   Upon  registering to receive the OAP or DP, all 
                                                 
5 Other countries in sub-Saharan Africa that provide state pensions to the elderly include Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mauritius and South Africa. Only Namibia and South Africa also have comprehensive national systems for cash 
transfers to households of vulnerable children.  
6 In early 2009 the 1 USD = 10 N$. The N$ is pegged at par value to the South African Rand.  
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pensioners also take out a mandatory life insurance, whereby funeral costs to the amount of 
N$2,200 are covered when the pensioner dies.
7 Since the OAP is non-contributory and since a 
change in employment status is not a precondition , Devereux (2001) suggests that it is not a 
pension at all but instead is a social assistance programme targeted at the elderly as a designated 
vulnerable group. Accordingly, since 1998 the OAP and DP have been referred to as the Basic  
State Grant. The third type of social pension is a War Veterans Subvention (WVS), designated 
for those who participated in the struggle for Independence. 
Table 1: Main features of social cash transfers in Namibia 
  Amount 
(N$/month)  Eligibility  Means test  Recipients 
(as of Dec08)  Legislation 
Old Age Pension
 1/  450  60+ yrs; Citizen/PR, 
resident 








1/  450  16+ yrs; disabled, blind 
or AIDS; Citizen/PR, 
resident 

















200 + 100 
per additional 
child (max 6) 
<18 yrs(<21); single 
parent or spouse 












200  <16yrs; disabled, blind 
or AIDS; Citizen/PR, 
resident 
No 
Foster Care Grant  200 + 100 
per additional 
child 




No  13,404 




<21 yrs; in place of 
safety 
   
Sources: Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare, Ministry of Labour and  Social Services, Ministry of 
Veterans Affairs. 
Note: 1/ Includes funeral insurance up to the amount of N$2,200. 
                                                 
7 The funeral scheme and the provision of decent burials were introduced on grounds of human dignity, but there is 
also an administrative benefit in that the application for the burial funds enables the authorities to cancel the pension 
card, thus limiting opportunities for fraudulent claims.  
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Table 2: Values of social cash transfers before and after equalisation
1/ 















1989    55  192  150  65  100  75  382  7:1 
1990    92  192  150  92  100  92  382  4:1 
1991    92  192  150  92  100  92  382  4:1 
1992    120  192  150  120  120  120  382  3:1 
1993    120  192  150  120  120  120  382  3:1 
1994  135                1:1 
Latest: 
2008  450                1:1 





“blacks”  “Coloured”  “Basters”  Namas  Hereros  “White”     
1995    58.91  288  182.5  58.2  63.41  582    10:1 
1996  340                1:1 
Latest: 
2008  400                1:1 





”  “Basters”  Namas  “Blacks”  “White”       
1995    330  225  93.6  72  891      12:1 
1996  340                1:1 
Latest: 
2008  400                1:1 





”  “Basters”  Namas  “Blacks”  “White”       
1995    1.54  0.95  1.02  0.8  9.76      12:1 
1996  10                1:1 
Latest: 
2008  10                1:1 
Sources: Ministry of Health and Social Service (1996) and UNICEF (1991) and authors‟ calculations. 
Note:  1/ The racial categories are not applied consistently in the administrative and historical records and this 
ambiguity is reflected in this and subsequent graphics. 
 
The social pensions can be traced back to South Africa‟s Old Age Pensions Act of 1928 and the 
extension of eligibility to “white” residents of colonial South West Africa in 1949. In 1973  
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eligibility  was  extended  to  all  residents  albeit  at  highly  differentiated  rates.  According  to 
UNICEF (1991) the highest pensions were paid to “whites” at a monthly rate of N$382 and the 
lowest pensions were paid to people in Owambo, Kavango or Caprivi at a monthly rate of N$55: 
in other words, a ratio of 7:1 (Table 2). 
 
After  independence  in  1990  the  new  constitution  entrenched  equality  and  freedom  from 
discrimination, and enhanced the standing of the country‟s pension system. Under the National 
Pensions Act of 1992 the age for eligibility was standardised at 60 for both men and women 
(previously it had been 65 for men) and, after a couple of increments in the lowest pension rates, 
the pensions were finally equalised at N$135 in May 1994. Equalisation meant a lowering of the 
value of the pension especially for “whites” (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Value of Old Age and Disability Pension before and after equalisation, N$ 
 
Sources: Information on value of pensions from Ministry of Finance budget documents www.mof.gov.na (accessed 









1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Equalised rate Owambo, Kavango, Caprivi
Rehoboth "Baster" Herero, Nama
Tswana Damara
"White" 1994 equalised rate, inflation adjusted
1989 rate for Owambo, Kavango, Caprivi, inflation adjusted 
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Since then the value of the pension has been raised several times based on assessments during 
the government‟s annual budget planning process of the availability of fiscal resources. In recent 
years the value of the pension has increased in real terms, outpacing inflation and the 2008 real 
value of the pension was 35 percent higher than at the time of equalisation, and 51 percent higher 
than in 1999. The value of the WVS has increased even more rapidly from N$500 in 1999 to 
N$2,000 in 2007. This represents a real increase of 115 percent. Moreover, the age criterion of 
55 years or more has been removed and an annual income threshold of N$36,000 has been set as 
another criterion. Anyone earning less than this amount and who the authorities are satisfied took 
part in the liberation struggle (more on this below) are eligible irrespective of age, wealth or 
employment status. In 2004 the responsibility for the OAP and DP was shifted from the Ministry 
of  Health  and  Social  Welfare  to  the  Ministry  of  Labour  and  Social  Services,  whereas  the 
responsibility for the WVS since 2006 has rested with a newly established Ministry of Veterans‟ 
Affairs. 
 
3.2 Child grants 
There are four main types of child grants. The first is the Child Maintenance Grant (CMG), 
which  is  paid  to  a  biological  parent  with  a  child  under  18  years,  and  whose  spouse:  (i)  is 
receiving an old age or disability grant; (ii) has passed away; or (iii) is serving a prison sentence 
of 3 months or longer. Unlike the state pensions and other child grants the CMG is means tested 
and restricted to applicants with monthly incomes of less than N$1,000. The applicant must also 
provide  each  child‟s  birth  certificate  (or  confirmation  of  birth  or  baptism  card)  and  school 
attendance records if the child is older than 7 years. The main part of the grant is not designed as 
a conditional cash transfer; school attendance records are required simply as documentation that 
the child is alive, but it may have similar behavioural effects as a conditional grant. Moreover, 
the grant may be extended until the child turns 21 years of age as long as the child was registered 
before turning 18 and with the condition that the child continues secondary schooling. Since 
2000 the value of the grant has been N$200 for the first child and N$100 for each additional 
child (max 6 children).  
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Figure 3: Value of Maintenance Grant for single parent with three children before and 
after equalisation, N$ 
  
Sources: Information on value of grant from Ministry of Health and Social Service (1996) and Ministry of Finance 
(2008). Inflation adjustment based on CPI data from Central Bureau of Statistics. 
 
The second grant targeted towards children is the Foster Care Grant (FCG), which is paid to any 
person who, whether for reward or otherwise, undertakes the temporary care of any child who 
has been placed in his/her custody. The value of the FCG is the same as the CMG although there 
is no ceiling set for the number of qualifying children. The third type of child grant is the Special 
Maintenance Grant (SMG) of N$200 per month, which is paid to all caregivers of children below 
16 years of age who have been diagnosed by a State doctor as being temporarily or permanently 
disabled, including blind children and those with AIDS. Finally, a Place of Safety Allowance of 
N$10 per child per day is paid to a person or institution who is taking care of a child who: (i) is 











1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Equalised rate Other "blacks"
"Coloured" "Basters"
Namas Hereros
"White" 1996 equalised rate, inflation adjusted
1995 rate for Other "blacks", inflation adjusted 
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Figure 4: Value of Foster Care Grant for single caregiver with three children before and 
after equalisation, N$ 
 
 
Sources: Information on value of grant from Ministry of Health and Social Service (1996) and Ministry of Finance 
(2008). Inflation adjustment based on CPI data from Central Bureau of Statistics. 
 
Like the social pensions, the child grants are rooted in the pre-Independence legislation adopted 
from  South  Africa,  notably  the  Children‟s  Act  33  of  1960,  which  was  made  applicable  in 
Namibia with effect from 1 January 1977 by Act 74 of 1973. The rates paid to different ethnic 
groups were even more discriminatory than the  social  pensions  discussed above. Before the 
grants were equalized a “white” caregiver with three children would receive N$582 compared to 
N$58.20 to a Nama caregiver with three children, a ratio of 10:1 (also Table 2). In 1997 rates 
were equalized at a level higher for most ethnic groups.
8 The rate of equalization was set at 
                                                 
8 The information presented here on the value of child grants is from a Ministry of Health and Social Services memo 
dated 19 July 1996, which serves as the background document for the 3 February 1997 authorisation from Ministry 
of Finance to equalise the rates for the child grants. That document also alludes to some of the difficulties law 
makers were facing when reviewing the grant system: “At Independence, Namibia inherited a discriminatory and 
confusing system in which written documentation for current practice cannot be traced.” The document also notes 
















1996 equalised rate, inflation adjusted 1995 rate for "Blacks", inflation adjusted 
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N$160 for the first child and N$60 for each additional child (maximum three). For a “white” 
caregiver of three the change meant a decrease in the grant by 40 percent, whereas for a Nama 
caregiver of three there was an increase of almost 500 percent (Table 2 and Figure 3). Before 
equalization the FCG was paid at rates that ranged from N$297 per child per month for “white” 
families  to  N$24  per  child  per  month  for  “blacks”,  a  ratio  of  12:1.  Equalization  implied  a 
reduction in the “white” rate of almost 40 percent and an increase in the rate for “blacks” of 
almost 400 percent (Table 2 and Figure 4).  
Figure 5: Value of Place of Safety Grant per child per month before and after equalisation, 
N$ 
 
Sources: Information on value of grant from Ministry of Health and Social Service (1996) and Ministry of Finance 
(2008). Inflation adjustment based on CPI data from Central Bureau of Statistics. 
 
 
Initially the value of the child grants was linked to the value of the pension, and when the 
pensions were raised in 2000 so were the CMG and PFG. However, since then the value of the 
child grants has remained unchanged despite several increases in the pension. As a result the 











1996 equalised rate, inflation adjusted 1995 rate for "Blacks", inflation adjusted 
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received by a caregiver of three has eroded 39 percent since equalisation in 1996 and by 23 
percent since 1999. The place of safety grant was also equalized in 1997 at N$10 per child per 
day,  which  was  slightly  above  the  rate  paid  to  “whites”  who  received  N$9.76  compared  to 
N$0.80  for  other  “blacks”  (Table  2  and  Figure  5).  However,  since  then  there  has  been  no 
adjustment in the value of this grant, with its real value lower by 56 percent since 1996 and 46 
since 1999. 
 
Table 3 summarises the changes in the different grant values adjusted for inflation. It is clear that 
the value of the social pensions has increased in real terms, while the child grants have not only 
fallen  behind  the  pensions  but  have  had  their  real  value  significantly  eroded  in  the  post-
Independence era. 
 
Table 3: Real change in values of social cash transfers  
  Old Age/ Disability 
Pension   
Child 
Maintenance/Foster 
Care Grant (3 pax) 
  Place of Safety 
Allowance    War Veterans 
subvention 
               
Real change since:  1994  1999  1996  1999  1996  1999  1999 
  35%  51%  -39%  -23%  -57%  -46%  115% 
               
Sources: Authors‟ computations based on administrative records of the grant values and Consumer Price 
Index data from the Central Bureau of Statistics.  
 
3.3 Coverage, targeting and administration 
The combined number of recipients of the various social grants using the most recent figures 
comes to around 250,000 people or about 12 percent of the estimated total population in 2008. 
No consistent time series of recipients of the social transfers is available although since 2003 
recording has improved and monthly data are now provided disaggregated by grant type and 
region. Figure 6 uses various sources to piece together a picture of the evolution of recipients of 
the social transfers since 1990. Despite gaps for certain earlier years, historical data all rely on 
the  administrative  records  of  the  Department  of  Social  Welfare  as  the  source  and  therefore  
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should be broadly comparable. Devereux (2001) thus reports 53,129 recipients of the OAP and 
DP in 1990.  
Figure 6: Recipients of social cash transfers
1/ in Namibia since 1990
2/ 
 
Sources: After 2002: administrative records from Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare, Ministry of 
Labour and Social Services and Ministry of Veterans Affairs. Before 2002: Schleberger (2002), Devereux (2001), 
Fultz and Pieris (1999) and Subbarao (1998).  
Notes: 1/ CMG = Child Maintenance Grant; FCG = Foster Care Grant; AOP = Old Age Pension; DP = Disability 
pension; WVS = War Veterans Subvention. 2/ Where monthly data was given the annual figure reported on the 
graph is for the latest month available.  
 
According to the latest administrative records that figure has increased to 150,893 in December 
2008, an increase of 184 percent. Most of the increase appears to be as a result of an increase in 
the recipients of the OAP, whereas the increase in recipients of the DP has been lower. The 
number of recipients of the WVS has increased from just over 100 at the time the pension was 
introduced in 1999 to 1767 in 2007. Figure 6 also illustrates how for several years after 1990 the 
number of recipients of the child grants was low and much lower than for the pensions. There are 
several reasons for this. Notably, prior to Independence the CMG was not made available at all  
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in  the  northern  regions  of  Ovambo,  Kaoko,  Kavango  and  Caprivi  and  so  the  gap  in  these 
populous  areas  was  particularly  large  (UNICEF  1991).  Moreover,  since  then  the  main 
bottlenecks to expanding coverage has been the lack of necessary documentation required to 
register a child, notably a birth certificate, and more generally lack of awareness of the grants 
(Ashby et al 2006). However, under new initiatives from the authorities coverage of the child 
grants has increased markedly in recent years, especially in the previously under-served regions. 
 
This change has coincided with the transfer of responsibility for paying the child grants from the 
Ministry of Health and Social Services to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Social Welfare. 
According to administrative data, in January 2003 a total of 9,676 children were registered for a 
CMG or a FCG. In December 2008 that number had increased ten-fold to 99,490, with CMG 
recipients numbering 86,086 and FCG recipients numbering 13,404. Access to grants has been 
expanded, particularly after a campaign by the Ministry and the UN‟s World Food Programme to 
register vulnerable children in six northern regions for food aid and hence to transfer these to the 
child grants. In just two years from April 2006 coverage in these regions increased by 16,000 
over and above what would have been expected from past expansion rates (Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Social Welfare and World Food Programme 2008). Particularly noteworthy is the 
region of Caprivi where just 20 children received grants in January 2003, corresponding to 0.1 
percent of all children under 18. By December 2008 the number of child grant recipients in 
Caprivi had increased to 5015 or 13 percent of all children under 18 (Table 4). Other regions 
where child grants are paid to more than 10 percent of all children are Ohangwena, Omusati, 
Ohsana, and Oshikoto. In all these regions fewer than 1 percent of children received the grants in 
2003. Nationally, just over 11 percent of children under 18 receive a grant.  
 
There are also large regional variations in the recipients of the OAP. Given its universality, these 
regional variations point to some impediments to access whereby some of those being entitled to 
the grant do not receive it. For instance, in Erongo and Omaheke, 29 and 27 percent, respectively 
of those aged 60 and over appear not to receive the pension (Table 5). However, in some cases 
the  number  of  recipients  exceed  those  of  the  eligible  age,  which  could  be  a  sign  of  errors 
whereby some not eligible are receiving the pension, but more likely it is due to inaccuracies in  
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the population projections used as the basis for determining the number of people 60 years and 
older. The latter would also explain some of the under-coverage in the data. 
 
While all the social cash transfers have as eligibility criteria that the applicant must be either a 
citizen or permanent resident, and reside in the country, a number of additional criteria apply to 
the various grant types. Notably, a key feature of the OAP has been its universality, in contrast to 
the CMG and more recently the war veterans‟ pension, where means tests are applied to ensure 
that these transfer are targeted to lower income applicants. Before Independence the means test 
for the CMG was applied to target disadvantaged “white” mothers earning less than N$300 per 
month (UNICEF 1991). Since  the equalisation of the grants,  the income threshold has  been 
raised to N$500 and again to N$1,000. This threshold pertains to income only and only that of 
the applicant, thus the assets of the household and the income of other household members are 
not considered unlike in South Africa, for instance. Usually eligibility under the means test is 
determined by a salary slip or a note from the employer to certify the income level. In the case of 
the veterans pension there is a comprehensive vetting process to ensure that the applicant did in 
fact  participate  in  the  Independence  struggle,  and  eligibility  under  the  means  test  is  also 
determined through documentation of salary levels. 
 
Recipients of pensions and child grants receive payments through a bank transfer, collection at a 
post  office  or  institution  (e.g.  old  age  home)  or  a  mobile  unit  (Figure  7).  According  to 
administrative records about two thirds of recipients of social transfer receive their cash grant 
through a mobile ATM where cash is dispersed upon the match of the name and ID number and 
the recipient‟s fingerprint, with a database carried by the mobile unit. 
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Table 4: Recipients of child grants by region
1/ 
  January 2003  April/May 2004  December 2008 
    TG  Pop<18 
TG in % of 
Pop<18    CMG  FCG  TG  Pop<18 
TG in % of 
Pop<18    CMG  FCG  TG  Pop<18 
TG in % of 
Pop<18 
Caprivi  20  37353  0.1  1016  0  1016  37388  2.7  4716  299  5015  38958  12.9 
Erongo  610  43698  1.4  674  299  973  47883  2.0  2230  799  3029  66974  4.5 
Hardap  1643  31131  5.3  1513  593  2106  32288  6.5  2358  1050  3408  37050  9.2 
Karas  962  28543  3.4  815  246  1061  30686  3.5  1787  676  2463  39978  6.2 
Kavango  414  108082  0.4  514  442  956  108577  0.9  6301  1356  7657  111240  6.9 
Khomas  1999  102388  2.0  2380  568  2948  112149  2.6  5917  1348  7265  156819  4.6 
Kunene  341  36053  0.9  479  174  653  37406  1.7  3672  465  4137  42864  9.7 
Ohangwena  334  131951  0.3  1262  364  1626  132643  1.2  14865  1641  16506  135948  12. 
Omaheke  755  36508  2.1  869  138  1007  38365  2.6  2429  592  3021  46637  6.5 
Omusati  363  119640  0.3  1993  365  2358  118374  2.0  14291  1301  15592  113430  13.8 
Oshana  837  79774  1.0  1930  345  2275  81194  2.8  12643  1599  14242  87099  16.4 
Oshikoto  355  89656  0.4  995  81  1076  92855  1.2  10922  1247  12169  106813  11.4 
Otjozondjupa  1043  69150  1.5  1185  471  1656  78775  2.1  3955  1031  4986  94559  5.3 
Namibia  9676  869115  1.1  15625  4086  19711  948583  2.1  86086  13404  99490  898651  11.1 
                           
Sources: Data on grant recipients provided by Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare; population data from population projections by the Central 
Bureau of Statistics. 
Notes: 1/ CMG = recipients of Child Maintenance Grant; FCG = Foster Care Grant; TG = total grant recipients (CMG+FCG); Pop<18 = Central Bureau of 
Statistics population estimate of population under 18 for the year. No separate data for CMG and FCG is available before 2004.  
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Table 5: Recipients of social pension by region 
1/ 
        November 2003    August 2004    December 2008 
        OAP  Pop>59  Coverage    OAP  Pop>59  Coverage    OAP  Pop>59  Coverage 
Caprivi      4239  4561  92.9    4339  4476  96.9    5060  4508  112.2 
Erongo      4612  7090  65.0    5004  7455  67.1    6525  9198  70.9 
Hardap      5230  5510  94.9    5632  5673  99.3    6063  6522  93.0 
Karas      3717  4123  90.2    3913  4194  93.3    4396  4623  95.1 
Kavango      8405  11606  72.4    8835  11288  78.3    10777  10926  98.6 
Khomas      6684  9714  68.8    7250  10112  71.7    9722  12287  79.1 
Kunene      4686  5335  87.8    4933  5397  91.4    5725  5917  96.8 
Ohangwena    17758  17758  100.0    18141  18306  100.0    18950  21763  87.1 
Omaheke      3903  4816  81.0    4075  5073  80.3    4573  6254  73.1 
Omusati      21448  20763  103.3    22122  20474  108.0    23791  20311  117.1 
Oshana      11220  10920  102.7    11742  10946  107.3    13943  11464  121.6 
Oshikoto      12038  12872  93.5    12497  13170  94.9    13712  14694  93.3 
Otjozondjupa    5954  5954  100.0    6119  6171  100.0    7218  9750  74.0 
Namibia      109894  119665  91.8    114819  117624  97.6    130455  114568  113.9 
                           
Sources: Data on pension recipients provided by Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare; Central Bureau of Statistics population estimate of popu-
lation under 18 for the year. 
Notes: 1/ OAP = Old Age Pension; Pop>59=Estimate of population over 59 for the year.  
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Figure 7: Payment modalities for social cash transfers, 2008 
 
Source: Data provided by the Office of the Prime Minister. 
 
Table 6 shows that the total costs of the social transfer system are approaching 2 percent of GDP 
and 6 percent of the total budget. This represents almost a doubling in real expenditure since the 
beginning of the decade. Two thirds of the resources are taken up by the AOP and DP. It is 
projected that for the fiscal year 2009/2010 the share of the budget devoted to the WVS will 
match that of the CMG/FCG. Data on administrative costs of the social transfer programmes are 
not readily available and it is not a straightforward matter to isolate those costs that are directly 
related to the cash transfer programmes and those that are related to other programmes of the 
departments and the general functioning of the ministries. This has led earlier studies to some 
very different conclusions about the costs of the social pension system. For instance, Clausen 
(2005: 37) suggests that: “The administrative costs constitute only around 4 percent of total 
costs for the pension scheme and are relatively small compared to the costs of other countries‟ 
welfare programs.” However, this appears to be exclusively based on costs of delivering cash 
disbursements from the mobile units (N$9.75 to deliver a N$300 pension) and does not seem to 
include the costs of other disbursement modalities nor the wider costs to the (former) Department 
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of  Social  Services  in  administering  the  programme.  In  an  earlier  study,  Subbarao  (1998) 
suggested that the real administrative costs of the social transfers was more like 36 percent of the 
value of the transfer and that the costs were growing at the time. The reason for the escalation in 
the costs appears to be that even after privatisation of the cash distribution function in the mid 
1990‟s there was no contraction of the staff of the department. 
As the system of social grants is being scaled-up in terms of coverage it becomes pertinent to 
assess the impacts the system is having on promoting national social development objectives 
notably in terms of reducing poverty and inequality. The next section seeks to provide such and 
assessment.  
Table 6: Government expenditure on social cash transfers
1/ 
  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05  05/06  06/07  07/08  08/09  09/10   
  In million N$ 
Maintenance grants, 
Foster parent 
allowances   57  57  57  49  90  100  130  193  202   
Social Pensions  252  332  381  443  455  590  660  851  880   
Veterans Subvention  14  12  13  12  14  17  21  120  197   
Total grants and 
pensions  322  401  450  504  559  707  811  1,165  1,279   
                     
Total expenditure  10,302  11,399  12,245  12,771  13,193  15,279  17,827  22,465  21,749   
GDP  28,992  33,142  34,506  37,300  41,526  48,228  53,564  59,516  64,590   
                     
  In percent of total expenditure 
Maintenance grants, 
Foster parent 
allowances   0.55  0.50  0.47  0.39  0.68  0.65  0.73  0.86  0.93   
Social Pensions  2.45  2.91  3.11  3.47  3.45  3.86  3.70  3.79  4.05   
Veterans Subvention  0.13  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.53  0.90   
Total grants and 
pensions  3.13  3.52  3.68  3.95  4.24  4.63  4.55  5.18  5.88   
                     
  In percent of GDP 
Maintenance grants, 
Foster parent 
allowances   0.20  0.17  0.17  0.13  0.22  0.21  0.24  0.32  0.31   
Social Pensions  0.87  1.00  1.10  1.19  1.10  1.22  1.23  1.43  1.36   
Veterans Subvention  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.20  0.30   
Total grants and 
pensions  1.11  1.21  1.30  1.35  1.35  1.47  1.51  1.96  1.98   
Source: Compiled from budget documents available on www.mof.gov.na (accessed January 2009). 
Note: 1/ Figures from 2007/2008 onwards are estimates and projections. Figures do not reflect administrative costs.  
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4.  Empirical analysis: Data and methodology 
The empirical analysis to assess the impact of the social cash transfers on poverty and inequality 
relies on the Namibia Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) that was carried out 
from September 2003 to August 2004. The NHIES was based on a national two-stage probability 
sample of 9801 respondent households. Two forms or questionnaires were administered in the 
field. Form 1 was used to collect basic information about the household and the people living in 
it as well as information on household incomes and infrequent expenditure. On this basis it is 
possible, with some adjustments, to decompose total household incomes into those received from 
remuneration such as salaries and wages, social transfers from state grants and pensions, and 
residual income such as profits. Form 2 was a Daily Record Book where households had to 
record over a four week period all expenditures and receipts, item by item and including incomes 
and gifts (received and given out), made every day.
9 In preparing the impact analysis  of the 
social transfers using the NHIES two key methodological  issues arose. The first related to the 
appropriate measure of household welfare given the income and expenditure data, and the second 
issue related to the definition of recipients of social transfer given some ambiguity in the survey 
instrument. These two issues are discussed in turn below. 
 
In the international literature, it is often suggested that, for pragmatic rather than theoretical 
reasons, the expenditure concept is the better measure of welfare to use in developing countries 
(e.g. Deaton 1997).  This is because it is well established that poor people have a better 
conception  of  their  expenditures,  and  thus  poor  respondents  more  accurately  give  their 
expenditures in surveys than is the case with incomes. Some reasons why incomes are often 
under-captured amongst the poor is that poor wage earners do not always know what their wages 
are before deductions, or that poor subsistence farmers under -report the value of the crops they 
consume from their own production. On the other hand, it is held that income is better measured 
in developed countries. In highly unequal societies like Namibia, differences between these two 
concepts may also have other dimensions, since saving rates and access to credit can be very 
different between rich and poor. 
                                                 
9 There were 13 of such four week cycles each with a new set of households. While adding to the cost and 
complexity of the survey operation, the main advantage of carrying out the survey over a full 12 month cycle was 
that effects attributable to monthly seasonality were evened out.  
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Figure 8: Household income as share of household expenditure by quintile
1/ 
 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
Note: 1/ Quintiles computed using annual expenditure in N$ per adult equivalent. 
 
In  Namibia,  with  both  rich  and  poor  in  one  country,  where  the  former  constitute  a  large 
proportion  of incomes  and expenditures,  and the latter a large proportion  of the population, 
under-reporting of both income and expenditure is likely. Exhaustive questioning of all sources 
of income, as in the NHIES, is one way of trying to limit the problem of under-reporting of 
income. To deal with under-reporting of expenditure, the expenditure diary method for capturing 
expenditures has been used in the NHIES 2003/2004, so that poor recall of expenditures does not 
lead to too great under-estimation of expenditure amongst the rich. Yet problems of correctly 
capturing both income and expenditure will not have been eliminated. Comparing the incomes 
available for expenditure i.e. regular household income net of savings, other household income 
(notably from own production net of inputs) and of deductions by employer with what is actual 
expenditure  illustrates  the  challenge  (Annex  A  contains  details  of  the  components  of  the 
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expenditures  and  reveals  that  incomes  are  particularly  under-reported  in  the  poorest  deciles, 
particularly Deciles 1 and 2, where less than three-quarters of expenditure is captured on the 
income  side.  One  important  implication  of  this  is  that  estimates  of  poverty  which  use  only 
income  as  data  source  will  tend  to  over-state  poverty  in  Namibia.  Overall,  the  correlation 
between these two concepts (which in principle should be the same) is only 0.70, which implies 
that variations in income only explain about half of variations in expenditure. One important 
reason that incomes may be underreported for the poorest households could have to do with the 
way that remittances and inter-household transfers are recorded. It is well-known that these types 
of transfers are an important source of livelihoods in Namibia (Subbarao 1998; Devereux and 
Naeraa 1996) but there was no clear way of capturing these in the NHIES.  
 
It is also apparent from Figure 8 that income is not greatly under-reported amongst the rich in 
Namibia;  in  fact,  income  and  expenditure  are  for  the  top  quintile  on  average  very  close. 
However, both these measures may in fact be under-reported. It is for instance well known from 
the most recent Income and Expenditure Survey in South Africa (conducted in 2005/2006) that 
the diary method lead to considerable under-reporting of expenditure amongst the more affluent 
in that country, probably because of respondent fatigue (Van der Berg and Yu 2007). If this was 
also  the  case in  Namibia, it is  likely that actual  expenditure would in  fact  exceed  recorded 
income, indicating that income may also be under-estimated amongst the more affluent. This is 
quite likely to  be true for income from  profits,  interest  and dividends which is  likely to  be 
underestimated in a survey such as the NHIES. 
 
One  possible  way  of  dealing  with  the  inaccuracies  resulting  from  under-recording  of  both 
income (especially amongst the poor) and expenditure (amongst the rich) is to assume that for 
any individual household, the higher of these two measures is the accurate one. This makes the 
assumption that there is no over-reporting of either concept, which would mean that taking the 
higher of the two would be closer to the true measure, although there may still be some under-
capturing. Such a „hybrid‟ measure should be a little more accurate than either of its alternatives.  
 
Based on this discussion the subsequent analysis relies on three measures of welfare. The first is 
household income (excluding savings and deductions by employers but including the value of  
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own production net of inputs), a definition that has been determined to make it consistent with 
with  the  second  welfare  measure,  household  expenditure.  The  third  measure  is  the 
income/expenditure „hybrid‟, which takes the value of the higher of the two.
10 Figure 9 presents 
the three measures using kernel density functions, which are essentially smoothed versions of 
their histograms. The more leftward orientation of the income   density  function reflects the 
generally lower levels of reported incomes and its flatter base the greater dispersion of incomes. 
When income is combined with the expenditure measure, the resulting „hybrid‟ has the familiar 
log normal shape, but with slightly lower levels of poverty and, given the broader base, slightly 
higher inequality than the measure based purely on expenditure. 
 
Figure 9: Kernel density functions for measures of household welfare 
  
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
 
                                                 
10 This paper follows the practice at the Central Bureau of Statistics by adjusting the welfare measures for household 
composition using the following weighting scheme to determine an adult equivalent: 0.5 for children up to 5 years, 
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The second methodological issue to be addressed relates to the definition of the social grants 
recipients in the NHIES. With regards to the DP and WVS the survey instrument was quite 
explicit in the way this information was captured. However, it is clear from inspection of the data 
that the category of “Old age pension” includes recipients of other types of pensions than just the 
state grant. In these cases it is natural to assume that the pensioner would have mixed public and 
private sources of pensions and erroneously reported one total amount to the field worker from 
the Central Bureau of Statistics. For purposes of the analysis in this paper an adjustment is thus 
made to include as AOP recipients of households that have one or more members 60 years or 
older and the pension income is capped at an annual maximum of  N$3,000 per age-eligible 
household member (reflecting 12 months of a N$250 pension). Any reported pension income 
above this amount is regarded as emanating from a private source of pensions. Given the small 
number of recipients of the DP and WVS, the subsequent analysis is less focused on these grant 
types.  
 
When it comes to the child grants, the survey instrument captured these under a heading of 
“Family and other allowances (including state maintenance and child grants)” which is open for 
interpretation of the respondents and enumerators and again is likely to capture other elements of 
transfer income than merely the social grants. In this case the data was adjusted to define as a 
child grant recipient households with an age-eligible child who had lost one or both biological 
parents, and who reported an income under the category. Although the criteria for eligibility also 
makes it possible that children of whom one parent is in jail, or who is an OAP recipient, can 
qualify, these numbers are small and the criteria cannot be determined from the NHIES, thus the 
possibility that some children were in these categories was ignored for these purposes. Since the 
number of recipients of FCG in 2003/2004 was relative small (fewer than 4000 nationwide) the 
results are reported for the two grant types together, but would mainly capture recipients of the 
CMG. Based on discussions emanating from this study, the Central Bureau of Statistics has 
redesigned the survey instrument of the next round of the NHIES (covering 2009/2010) in order 
to better capture the incomes from the various social cash transfers. Nevertheless, even if less 
than ideal, the adjustments made to the 2003/2004 NHIES appear to bring survey results broadly 
in line with data from administrative sources. Figure 10 shows a tendency for the adjusted survey 
data  to  slightly  underestimate  the  total  amounts  received  by  households  and  the  number  of  
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recipients when it comes to AOP, while slightly over-estimating when it comes to the child 
grants. Moreover, results from the two methodologies are closer when it comes to the number of 
recipients than when it comes to the aggregate amounts, which could have something to do with 
the difficulties in distinguishing annual from monthly amounts when reporting and capturing the 
data. Nevertheless, while some degree of divergence is expected simply due to the statistical 
sampling errors associated with the survey and challenges in recording on the administrative 
side, the two sets of estimates appear sufficiently close for the analysis to proceed. 
 
Figure 10: Correspondence between survey and administrative data on cash transfers
1/ 
 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES and data from Ministry of Gender Equality and Social 
Welfare and Ministry of Labour and Social Services. 
Note: 1/ The figures on NHIES 2003/2004 are computed as the amounts reported by households in the survey 
whereas the amounts for Administrative data are computed by multiplying the number of recipients in each month of 
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5.  Poverty and inequality in Namibia and the impact of cash transfers 
For purposes of assessing the poverty impact of the social transfers the study uses the welfare 
measures  defined  above  (income,  expenditure  and  „hybrid‟  adjusted  expressed  in  per  adult 
equivalents) and the official poverty thresholds. For purposes of reporting poverty the study 
follows convention by using the decomposable class of poverty measures proposed by Forster et 
al  (1984). Three special cases  of this  set  of measures are of particular interest: the poverty 
headcount (P0), the poverty gap (P1) and the severity of poverty or squared poverty gap (P2), the 
two  latter  of  which  are  more  sensitive  towards  changes  in  welfare  below  the  poverty  line. 
Following the cost of basic needs poverty line set out in Central Bureau of Statistics (2008), the 
analysis of poverty uses annual expenditure of N$2,217.72 per adult equivalent as the severe 
poverty line (or the lower-bound poverty line), and N$3,149.4 as the total poverty line (or the 
upper-bound poverty line). 
5.1  Impact on poverty 
The analysis of the impact on poverty of the cash transfers is descriptive and static and assumes 
that  no  behavioural  changes  occur  due  to  the  transfers  nor  do  the  transfers  generate  any 
externality  or  general  equilibrium  effects.  The  first  set  of  results  are  presented  under  „With 
transfers‟ in the Table 7, which shows that when using household expenditure as the welfare 
measure severe poverty affects about 20.2 percent of the population, whereas poverty (including 
severe poverty) affects 37.8 percent of the population.
11 These are the baseline results for welfare 
variables that include the cash transfer incomes. Thus, using the expenditure figures, roughly the 
bottom quintile of the population are severely poor, and the second quintile poor but not severely 
poor. When using household income as the welfare  measure however, severe poverty rises to 
51.3 percent and all poverty to 59.1 percent.  In other words the resultant poverty level is highly 
sensitive to the choice of welfare measure. The difference in results can be ascribed to the under-
reporting of income by the poor as discussed earlier, and the income measure of poverty is thus 
less suitable for this type of analysis. Perhaps the closest figure to the correct value would be the 
poverty levels computed using the „hybrid‟ measure, i.e. assuming that the highest of income or 
                                                 
11 Note that this refers to the share of the population in poverty and not to the share of households as is the case in 
the most recent official poverty estimates (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008). The weight applied to the data is thus 
the household  weight  multiplied by  household size  following  Deaton  (1997). Using household  weights only, a 
smaller proportion would have been regarded as poor, due to the larger household size amongst the poor.   
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expenditure  is  the  correct  welfare  measure,  as  explained  above.  According  to  this  measure, 
severe poverty is 17.8 percent and overall poverty 34.0 percent. 
  
Table 7: Effect of social cash transfers on levels of poverty 
   Lower bound poverty line                    Upper bound poverty line              




Effect of transfers 
on poverty 
measure 




Effect of transfers 
on poverty 
measure 
  Revised per adult equivalent income 
Incidence (P0)  0.513  0.536  -4.3%  0.591  0.602  -1.8% 
Gap (P1)  0.305  0.374  -18.4%***  0.379  0.433  -12.5%*** 
Severity (P2)  0.216  0.298  -27.5%***  0.282  0.353  -20.1%*** 
  Per adult equivalent expenditure 
Incidence (P0)  0.202  0.259  -22.0%***  0.378  0.420  -10.0%* 
Gap (P1)  0.059  0.091  -35.2%***  0.129  0.168  -23.2%*** 
Severity (P2)  0.026  0.047  -44.7%***  0.061  0.091  -33.0%*** 
  “Hybrid” 
Incidence (P0)  0.178  0.234  -23.9%***  0.340  0.382  -11.0%* 
Gap (P1)  0.050  0.080  -37.5%***  0.113  0.150  -24.7%*** 
Severity (P2)  0.021  0.040  -47.5%***  0.052  0.080  -35.0%*** 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
* Significant at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%. 
 
The poverty reducing impact of the social transfers can be discerned by comparing these results 
with the results obtained by subtracting transfers from the welfare variable, which is done for the 
results under the heading „Without transfers‟ also in the Table 7. It is clear that poverty levels 
without the social transfers are higher. Using household expenditure, the incidence of poverty 
(P0) without the transfers is 25.9 and 41.8 percent at the lower and upper bound poverty lines 
respectively. The direct effect of the transfers is thus to lower poverty incidence by 22 and 10 
percent, respectively. This effect is statistically significant especially at the lower bound poverty 
line. The greater positive impact of the social transfers on the poorest of poor is also reflected in 
the significantly lower levels of the poverty gap (P1) and the severity of poverty (P2), when 
comparing household expenditure with and without social cash transfers, again especially at the 
lower bound poverty line. These findings are robust to the alternative specification of the welfare 
variable  using  the  „hybrid‟  measure,  but  clearly  not  when  it  comes  to  the  pure  measure  of 
household  income,  where  there  is  no  significant  difference  in  the  incidence  of  poverty  
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irrespective of whether transfers are included or not (although the changes to P1 and P2 are 
significant).  
 
Another way of illustrating the impact of the social transfers is by using the poverty incidence 
curves in Figure 11. The figure shows that at any given level of household welfare the curve for 
„without social transfers‟ lies above the curve for with social transfers, and thus poverty levels 
will be higher in the former case irrespective of where the poverty line is set. The indication of 
the two poverty lines on Figure 11 serves to show how the shift in poverty levels resulting from 
the social transfers is higher at the lower bound poverty line than at the upper bound poverty line. 
This confirms the earlier finding that the social transfers seem to have the greatest impact on the 
poorest of the poor. 
 
Figure 11: Poverty incidence curves with and without social cash transfers 
 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
 
In order to assess the impact of the social cash transfers on household welfare, given differences 
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regression was run to determine which factors contributed to households being in poverty. The 
results are summarised in Table 8. By controlling for the impact of other factors such as region, 
marital status, gender, education, age, employment status of household head, household size, the 
number of employed in the household, the number of children and the number of elderly, the 
impact of grant receipt on the probability of being in poverty can be considered. This was done 
both for the lower and upper poverty line and was also carried out for both the income measure 
of poverty and the expenditure measure (Table 8 shows the results for household expenditure). It 
is apparent that the OAP had a clear and significant negative association with poverty incidence 
(i.e. the pension lowers the probability that the recipient lives in a poor household), both at the 
lower  and  upper  bound  poverty  lines.  On  the  other  hand  the  CMG/FCG  and  the  DP  had  a 
significant negative association with poverty incidence only at the upper bound. In contrast, the 
WVS in the more limited form this pension took at the time of the survey, seem to have had only 
a marginal (and insignificant) effect on lowering the probability of household poverty at the 
time.  
Table 8: Probit regressions: Estimates of grant receipt on incidence of household poverty 
(P0) at two poverty lines (using adult equivalent household expenditure)
 1/ 
  Lower bound poverty line    Upper  bound poverty line 
Old Age Pension  -0.2169**    -0.2087** 
War Veteran Subvention  -0.010    -0.0028 
Disability Pension  0.1208    -0.1841* 
Child Maintenance Grant and Foster Care Grant  -0.2042    -0.1886* 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
Notes: 1/
 Other factors controlled for: Region, area type, Marital status of household head, Gender of household 
head, Education of household head, Age of household head, Employment Status of household head, Household size 
and its square, Number of Employed in household, Number of Children 0-17, Number of elderly 60+. * Significant 
at 10% ** Significant at 5%.  
 
Table 9 deepens the analysis by focusing on the effect of grants on the poverty measures that are 
more sensitive to the depth and severity of poverty. It contains the summarised results of Tobit 
regressions,  which  censors  the value of the dependent  variable,  with  the dependent  variable 
being either the poverty gap ratio (P1) or the severity of poverty (P2). The table shows the 
coefficients for the impact of social grants on reducing the poverty measures under consideration  
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(P1 and P2). It is noteworthy that the effect of the old age pension is quite strong for both 
poverty  measures  and  at  both  poverty  lines.  All  four  coefficients  for  receipt  of  the  child 
maintenance grant are also significant, indicating that this grant does have an impact on reducing 
both the poverty gap ratio and the squared poverty gap ratio. Thus it appears that the effect of 
these grants is quite strong in reducing the more severe forms of poverty. Disability grants also 
play a significant role in reducing such poverty, but only at the upper-bound poverty line. 
Table 9: Tobit regressions: Effect of grant receipt on household poverty gap ratio (P1) and 
squared poverty gap ratio (P2) at two poverty lines (using expenditure measure 
of welfare)
 1/ 
  Lower bound poverty line    Upper  bound poverty line 
  P1  P2    P1  P2 
Old Age Pension  -0.1016***  -0.0575***    -0.0633***  -0.0435*** 
War Veterans Subvention  0.0178  -0.0238    0.0075  -0.0142 
Disability Pension  -0.0459  -0.0545*    -0.0273  -0.0325* 
Child Maintenance Grant and Foster 
Care Grant  -0.0728*  -0.0583**    -0.0368*  -0.0350** 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
Notes: 1/
 Other factors controlled for: Region, area type, Marital status of household head, Gender of household 
head, Education of household head, Age of household head, Employment Status of household head, Household size 
and its square, Number of Employed in household, Number of Children 0-17, Number of elderly 60+. * Significant 
at 10% ** Significant at 5% *** Significant at 1%. 
 
5.2  Inequality and targeting  
While the positive impact of social transfers on poverty reduction is quite clear, the transfers 
appear to have less of an effect when it comes to reducing inequality. Table 10 shows the Gini-
coefficients, using the three welfare measures and computed with and without the various grants. 
The  level  of  inequality  is  highest  for  the  income  based  measure,  again  due  to  the  under-
estimation of the income of the poor. The Gini-coefficients for expenditure and for the hybrid 
measure are more realistic even if they are still extremely high compared to other countries.
12 
Given  the overlapping  confidence  intervals ,  it  can  be  concluded that  the grants  make  no 
                                                 
12 Central Bureau of Statistics (2008) provides further comparison between inequality in Namibia‟s and other 
developing countries.  
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statistically significant difference, at conventional levels of confidence, in the standard measure 
of inequality irrespective of whether household expenditure or the „hybrid‟ measure of welfare is 
used. Nor is this conclusion affected by whether all grants are excluded or either of the two main 
categories of grants, social pensions and child grant. Only when using household income as the 
welfare  measure  is  there  a  (barely)  statistically  significant  difference  in  the  Gini-coefficient 
computed with and without social transfers. 
Table 10: Gini-coefficients with and without social cash transfers 
 
  Household income  Household expenditure  „Hybrid‟ 
       
       
























       
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
Note: Brackets show 95% confidence range. 
 
 
While the initial assessment is that the impact of the social grants on overall inequality measured 
by the Gini-coefficient may be small, it is useful to look more closely at the welfare distribution 
to further explore the effects of social transfers on poverty and inequality. Figure 12 displays the 
Lorenz curve for total household welfare using the income/expenditure hybrid and concentration 
curves for various income sources, notably social grants and wages/salaries. The line furthest 
below the 45 degree line of perfect equality is wages/salaries, which suggests that the overall 
effect of this type of income is inequality increasing for more than 80 percent of the population 
up to where the curve cuts through the Lorenz curve. The concentration curve for social pensions 
lies  above  the  45  degree  line,  which  suggests  that  this  type  of  income  tends  to  fall 
disproportionately to the poorer individuals and thus decrease inequality. On the graph it can also 
be discerned for example how the 40 percent poorest individuals command almost 70 percent of 
the total pension income, making this a highly pro-poor intervention. The 40 percent poorest 
individuals command 50 percent of the total child grant income. The shape of the concentration  
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curve for child grants however, is such that these grants appear targeted towards the poorest up 
until around the 25 percentile, but then the curve starts bending inwards towards the 45 degree 
line. The result is less effective targeting of the child grants.  
 
Figure 12: Lorenz and concentration curves for household income sources
1/  
 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
Note: 1/ Ranking of households using income/expenditure „hybrid‟ net of grants. 
 
In interpreting the targeting of the child grant, two different aspects need to be distinguished. On 
one hand, the main eligibility criteria (access is largely limited to children who are single or 
double  orphans)  ensure  that  there  is  good  targeting  of  poor  households,  as  children  and 
particularly  orphans  are  more  commonly  found  in  poor  households.  Thus  53  percent  of  the 
population  in  the  poorest  two  quintiles  are  children,  against  only  32  percent  in  the  richest 
quintile, and in the poorest two quintiles almost 18 percent of children are single or double 
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contain more than 60 percent of all orphans. On the other hand, targeting within the group of 
eligible may nevertheless be less accurate, as will be shown below. 
 
Table 11: Share of eligible households receiving child grant by means test threshold (in % 
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Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES. 
Note: Brackets show 95% confidence range. 
 
The finding that the social pensions are better targeted towards the poor than the child grants is 
somewhat surprising given the universality of the pensions and the means test of the child grants, 
which are intended to make only low income applicants eligible for support. One explanation for 
this could be that at the time of the survey in 2003/2004, and thus before the Government began 
a concerted effort to roll out the child grants especially among the poorest and most vulnerable 
households, the means test was not applied rigorously. Another important explanation relates to 
the way that the means test is designed. By linking the means test threshold to the individual 
caregiver and not the household opens for the possibility that better-off households receive the 
grants. There is corroboration for this in the data. Table 11 shows that the share of eligible 
households that receive child grants is not significantly different whether the household income 
is  above  or  below  the  N$1,000  per  month  threshold,  a  finding  that  is  robust  to  different 
specifications of the household welfare variable. While the NHIES contains no information on 
individual incomes it may be argued with good reason that the welfare of the child and the 
family should not only be determined by the income of the applicant, but more broadly by the 
household which they share. Indeed the share of recipient households does not change even 
when doubling the means test threshold (also Table 11). These results can be taken as further  
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proof of the lack of effectiveness of the targeting mechanism for the child grants, at least at the 
time of the survey. 
5.3  Comparison with South Africa 
A comparison with South Africa is instructive, especially given the origins of the Namibian 
system  of  social  cash  transfers.  Moreover,  as  policy  makers  in  Namibia  are  contemplating 
introducing a means test to the OAP, the South African experience is particularly relevant. The 
old-age pension in South Africa is means tested, and applies only to males aged 65 and above 
and women aged 60 and above (as used to be the case in Namibia). As has already occurred in 
Namibia, this gender distinction is now being eliminated in South Africa. The means test is set 
relatively high for the old age pension so that about 80 percent of old people do in fact receive 
the pension. The child support grants in South Africa are no longer linked to criteria other than 
age and the means test. This means test is stricter (though it was recently relaxed somewhat), 
with the consequence that fewer than half of the age-eligible children benefit from this grant. 
Criteria formerly applying to the South African child maintenance grants relating to household 
structure and the position of the caregiver (who usually had to be a single parent) have now been 
abolished. At the end of 2008, South African grant values were N$940 per month for both the 
Old Age Pension and the Disability Grant, N$210 for the Child Support Grant, and N$650 for 
the Foster Care Grant.  
 
According to recent survey data, which is broadly comparable to the NHIES, 87 percent of South 
Africa‟s age-eligible receive the pension compared to 82 percent of Namibia‟s. But South Africa 
has  a  means  test  for  social  pensions  despite  its  almost  universal  nature,  and  there  is  some 
evidence that it has an effect though not as much as would be expected. In the top quintile in 
South Africa 70 percent access the pension (Figure 13). In Namibia 74 percent of age-eligible 
persons in the top quintile get the grant. At the other end of the distribution 94 percent of the age-
eligible amongst the poorest 20 percent of the population receive the social pension in South 
Africa,  compared  to  87  percent  in  Namibia.  Generally  speaking  the  difference  between  the 
universal model pursued by Namibia and the means tested model pursued by South Africa does 
generate  different  outcomes,  though  these  differences  do  not  appear  overwhelming.  What  is 
particularly striking is the ineffectiveness of the means test in South Africa, mainly because the  
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threshold is set fairly high as noted earlier. Any further assessment of the two systems would 
thus need to carefully balance the costs of administering the means test, including the associated 
effects on incentives from the much higher level of the pension in South Africa with the slightly 
less efficient targeting in the Namibian case. 
 
Figure 13: Targeting of social pensions in Namibia and South Africa
1/  
 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES and on the South African 2005/2006 IES. 
Note: 1/ Household quintiles are derived using per adult equivalent expenditure before grants (i.e., all grant income 
= 0) for both Namibia and South Africa. Percentages refer to age-eligible households.  
 
 
For child grants, the picture is quite different. Firstly, in South Africa 57 percent of age-eligible 
children  get  the  grant,  versus only 13 percent  in  Namibia, according to the survey  data  for 
2003/2004 (although as already noted this picture is likely to have markedly changed in recent 
years as the programme has expanded in particularly poor regions). This difference is primarily 
accounted for by the fact that eligibility of child grants in Namibia is confined to those meeting 
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double orphans), whereas in South Africa the means test and age criteria are the only ones that 
apply. Despite the official means test, there is no evidence of targeting of the grants to poorer 
households within the group eligible by other criteria in Namibia. In all quintiles, access to the 
grant is low but it seems to peak as proportion of the age-eligible in the middle quintile at 15 
percent, and be lowest in the top quintile at 7 percent. Much of this targeting occurs through the 
eligibility  criteria  rather  than  the  means  test  as  more  children  and  orphans  are  live  in  poor 
households. In South Africa the evidence of targeting is much stronger, with 85 percent and 69 
percent of households with age-eligible children receiving the grants in the bottom two quintiles, 
compared to a still high 27 percent in the fourth quintile, and only 7 percent in the top quintile. 
Figure 14: Targeting of child grants in Namibia and South Africa
 1/  
 
Source: Authors‟ computations based on 2003/2004 NHIES and on the South African 2005/2006 IES. 
Note: 1/ Household quintiles are derived using per adult equivalent expenditure before grants (i.e., all grant income 
= 0) for both Namibia and South Africa. Percentages refer to age-eligible households and in Namibia the single-
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6.  Simulations and policy discussion 
The above analysis raises interesting and important questions regarding the further evolution of 
the Namibian social grant system. Firstly, it is quite clear that social grants play an important role 
in the reduction of poverty, especially amongst the very poor. Thus there are strong grounds for 
believing that, within realistic fiscal  constraints,  a further expansion of grants  would further 
reduce poverty particularly extreme poverty. This section discusses a range of issues faced by 
planners and policy makers in expanding access to the social grants and making their impact 
more pro-poor. The section begins by presenting a series of scenarios for the costs of the social 
transfer system and then discusses issues related to targeting and means testing. 
 
A simple set of simulations are illustrative of the likely fiscal pressures emanating from the 
social transfer system. The simulations are based on a set of different assumptions regarding 
population  dynamics  and  economic  growth.  The  population  dynamics  are  reflected  in  the 
projections  from  three  sources:  the  Central  Bureau  of  Statistics  in  Namibia,  the  US  Census 
Bureau and the UN Population Division. These projections differ notably in the way they have 
accounted for the impact of HIV/AIDS on the population. The projections by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics are clearly the most optimistic when it comes to population growth and by using 
lower levels of expected mortality in its medium variant scenario the total population of Namibia 
is projected to reach nearly 3 million by 2030. The projections from the UN Population Division 
and especially the US Census Bureau, which consider both the impact of the epidemic and the 
expansion in recent years of access to anti-retroviral treatment, are less optimistic. However, 
even if the levels differ between the different population projections they all point in the same 
direction when it comes to the falling dependency ratios, especially the child dependency ratio. A 
key effect here is the spike in fertility with the baby boom around the time of Independence and 
the ageing of these cohorts.  Using the data from  the Central  Bureau of Statistics  Figure 15 
illustrates the population dynamics notably the falling total and child dependency ratio and the 
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Figure 15: Population and dependency ratios 2001-2031 (medium variant) 
 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. 
 
The simulations combine the data on children and the elderly to estimate the demand for social 
transfers in 2010, 2020 and 2030. The simulations rest on the following simplifying assumptions: 
coverage of the OAP is expected to stay at 90 percent, for CMG/FCG coverage will increase to 
20 percent of all children under 18 years, and for WVS the number of recipients will increase to 
10,000 in 2010 and to 20,000 thereafter. A once-off doubling of the rates payable to recipients of 
CMG/FCG is included to allow for these grants to recover recent years‟ lost real value, but 
thereafter all grants are expected to follow the rate of inflation which is set at 5 percent annually. 
The final assumption relates to administration costs, which in the absence of detailed cost data 
have somewhat simplistically been set at 15 percent across all grant values. Once more detailed 
costs estimates have been established it would be easy to rerun the simulations. The population 
projections  are  combined  with  two  scenarios  for  real  GDP  growth,  which  reflect  Namibia‟s 
recent historical growth rate of 4 percent annually and one that reflects more subdued growth 
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assumptions  generate  six  different  outcomes  for  fiscal  costs  of  the  social  cash  transfer 
programmes for each year as presented in Table 12. 
 
The results show that under the broad assumption of continued growth in GDP at current levels 
the total costs of the social cash transfers are expected to fall from 2.6-2.7 percent to 1.6-2.0 
percent between 2010 and 2030, with the range representing the differences in the three sets of 
population projections. The falling shares of cost to GDP arise as a result of GDP growth rates 
outpacing the combined effects of inflation, growth in the number of recipients, and one-off 
adjustments to the grants. Under all three population scenarios the OAP/DP will command the 
largest share, followed by the adjusted CMG/FCG and the WVS. The costs shares of all these 
programmes are falling over time and thus as a whole the programmes of social transfers appear 
sustainable from  a  fiscal point of view. This  picture changes,  but  only slightly, if the GDP 
growth assumption is relaxed and real growth is assumed to slow to 2 percent annually. Under 
the two latter and more realistic population projections the share of costs of the social transfers to 
GDP will be either flat or falling from a peak of just under 3 percent. Three percent is also the 
ceiling on the budget deficit, which implies that the total costs of the social transfer programmes, 
even  under  a  longer  period  of  slower  economic  growth,  would  be  manageable  within  an 
otherwise balanced budget. 
 
Nevertheless,  issues  related  to  efficiency  and  cost-savings  will  remain  of  interest  to  policy 
makers. In particular, there is a long and ongoing debate about means testing of the OAP. The 
1992  National  Pension  Act,  the  1998  draft  amendment  to  the  Act,  and  the  1997  Poverty 
Reduction Strategy all make provisions for means testing to be introduced for the OAP.
13 While 
there thus appears to be political commitment to the principle of means testing th ere is less 
agreement on the modality of the test. Interestingly the National Development Plan 3 does not 
mention means testing at all in its sections on programmes for social welfare. To the contrary, 
the plan actually proposes increases in “the amounts of welfare grants in response to inflation” 
and keeps the target from the previous plan to increase coverage of the old age and disability 
grants to 95 percent of all elderly and disabled (National Planning Commission 2008: 209).  
                                                 
13 For instance, Section 16 (Regulations) of the National Pensions Act of 1992 states: “The income and assets of 
any applicant (are) to be taken into account in determining any national pension including the value of any assets 
alienated in any manner within a stated period immediately before application for such a pension.”  
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There are at least two issues to consider when it comes to means testing. The first is what the 
best way would be to improve the targeting of the OAP, and whether a means test is necessarily 
the only way of doing so. The second issue to consider is the actual cost of administering means 
testing. A strong case can be made that in a situation such as the Namibian one, where the old 
age pension is already universal, the introduction of a means test may only lead to behavioural 
changes that would not be desired from a policy perspective. Thus, it may create disincentives 
for individuals to make their own provisions for retirement, if such provision disqualifies people 
from receiving the social old age grant. An alternative way of dealing with this would be to use 
the tax system to recover at least part of the costs of old age pensions to more affluent old people 
through imposing taxes on this income, i.e. an ex-post approach that claws back the pension 
through revenue collection. On the other hand, if the costs of delivering pensions to recipients 
are high (and more detailed information is needed on the administrative costs of the pension and 
other cash transfer programmes) it may even be more worthwhile to try and reduce the number 
of pensions going to the non-poor in order to reduce fruitless expenditure. In such a case the tax 
system could potentially be used to impose a severe penalty for those who do take up such social 
pensions if they are also in the taxable income bracket. This can be done relatively easily and 
would not impose great costs in terms of changes in behaviour (although there may be some 
difficulty in treating spouses with varying incomes). 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, the child grants are presently in principle means tested though 
indications are that at least at the time of the NHIES, these means tests really were either not 
applied rigorously in practice or that their reference to the income level of the applicant allowed 
for large errors of inclusion when measured by household income. This may not be a great 
problem in most cases since many orphans and vulnerable children are in households that are so 
obviously poor that the means test may just add an unnecessary bureaucratic inconvenience. Yet 
amongst  the  much  smaller  number  of  non-poor  orphans  and  vulnerable  children,  there  is  a 
considerable proportion (as large a proportion as for the poorer orphans and vulnerable children, 
as has been indicated above) that does receive these grants without qualifying by the means test 
criterion. As the grant roll-out improves, such errors of inclusion would become increasingly  
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costly  in  budgetary  terms.  Moreover,  if  the  grant  value  is  increased,  it  will  from  a  fiscal 
perspective become even more necessary to keep numbers in check. 
 
Also, at the time of the survey the grants were reaching only a small proportion of orphans and 
vulnerable children. This proportion would now have risen considerably. However, an issue that 
has not yet been addressed is whether some other poor children may have even greater needs 
than many orphans and vulnerable children, but presently do not qualify for these because the 
eligibility  criteria  are  so  strongly  focused  on  the  orphan  (single  or  double)  status  of  the 
recipients. This is an issue that the Namibian social grant system will have to deal with as it 
matures: Who are the really needy, and what are the appropriate eligibility criteria to target 
them? Given the large unmet need amongst children, it would therefore appear that some further 
thinking is still necessary around the means test and also on eligibility criteria so as to cover all 
of the vulnerable. Means testing appears appropriate in a case such as this where there is such a 
large need that is not satisfied in order to contain budgetary costs including costs of delivering 
the grants, which are proportionately higher for children because of the smaller value of the 
grants they receive. 
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Table 12: Costs of social cash transfers programmes under different scenarios
1/ 
  Scenarios for population projections 
  Central Bureau of Statistics    US Census Bureau    UN Population Division 
  2010  2020  2030    2010  2020  2030    2010  2020  2030 
Total population  2,143,410  2,577,082  2,998,383    2,128,471  2,262,573  2,280,688    2,157,021  2,427,639  2,677,545 
Population 0-17  913,088  1,042,379  1,111,525    901,466  773,749  681,705    926,982  934,042  974,345 
Population 18-59  1,114,277  1,395,516  1,684,470    1,097,367  1,323,353  1,408,459    1,109,738  1,337,081  1,504,826 
Population 60+  116,045  139,187  202,388    129,638  165,471  190,524    120,301  156,516  198,374 
Child Dependency Ratio  0.82  0.75  0.66    0.82  0.58  0.48    0.84  0.70  0.65 
Aged Dependency Ratio  0.10  0.10  0.12    0.12  0.13  0.14    0.11  0.12  0.13 
Total Dependency Ratio  0.92  0.85  0.78    0.94  0.71  0.62    0.94  0.82  0.78 
  Simulations of costs, % of GDP 
Growth scenario 1 (real GDP growth=4%pa)                       
CMG/FCG  1.20  0.92  0.81    1.18  0.68  0.50    1.21  0.83  0.71 
OAP/DP  1.03  0.83  0.82    1.15  0.99  0.77    1.06  0.94  0.80 
WVS  0.38  0.51  0.35    0.38  0.51  0.35    0.38  0.51  0.35 
All social cash transfers  2.60  2.27  1.97    2.71  2.19  1.61    2.66  2.28  1.86 




       
CMG/FCG  1.29  1.21  1.29    1.28  0.90  0.79    1.31  1.09  1.13 
OAP/DP  1.11  1.09  1.30    1.24  1.30  1.23    1.15  1.23  1.28 
WVS  0.41  0.67  0.55    0.41  0.67  0.55    0.41  0.67  0.55 
All social cash transfers  2.81  2.98  3.14    2.93  2.87  2.57    2.87  2.99  2.96 
                       
Sources: Population projections are the „medium variants‟ from US Census Bureau, Central Bureau of Statistics and UN Population Division. 
Notes: 1/
 Common assumptions include: Inflation of 5% pa; coverage of OAP/DP of 90% of 60+ population; coverage of 20% of 0-17 population; coverage of 
WVS of 10,000 in 2010 and 20,000 thereafter; one-off adjustment to child grants of 100% then real value fixed; real value of pensions constant at 2008 level; 
Administration costs=15% of grant values. CMG=Child Maintenance Grant; FCG=Foster Care Grant; OAP=Old Age Pension; DP=Disability Pension; WVS=War 
Veterans Subvention.  
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The next set of simulations contrast the effects of improved targeting through means testing of 
the child  grants  against increased coverage through  expansion of these  grants,  based on the 
2003/2004 survey. A simulation of the effect of targeting the grants better (shifting all grants 
presently received by persons not in the bottom two quintiles to recipients in these two quintiles) 
shows that the population in poverty would have been about 2.9 percent smaller at the lower 
bound poverty line, and 1.2 percent at the upper bound poverty line at the time of the survey, and 
assuming no behavioural changes in response to the grants (see Simulation 1 in Table 13). This 
simulation  was  based  on  a  probit  model  containing  demographic  and  other  information  on 
households  to  reallocate  grants  to  the  lower  two  quintiles.  Eligible  households  were  thus 
allocated grants in accordance with their likelihood of receiving such grants in the survey. The 
percentage reduction in poverty would have been slightly greater for the poverty measures that 
are more sensitive to more severe poverty. Thus improving targeting could have brought a fair 
amount of impact on poverty, even though it is unlikely that this full impact is achievable in 
practice. 
Table 13: Simulations of poverty effects of better targeting versus expansion of child grants 
(using household expenditure per adult equivalent as welfare measure) 
  Lower bound poverty line   Upper bound poverty line  
  P0  P1  P2  P0  P1  P2 
Poverty level before simulation  0.202  0.059  0.026  0.378  0.129  0.061 
Simulation 1: Re-targeting all child grants to the lowest two quintiles   
Change in poverty level  -2.9%  -3.4%  -3.8%  -1.2%  -2.2%  -2.9% 
Simulation 2: Doubling grants spending without improving targeting   
Change in poverty level  -3.1%  -3.8%  -4.4%  -1.2%  -2.4%  -3.3% 
Note: A probit model containing demographic and other information on households was used to reallocate grants to 
the lower two quintiles in simulation 1, and to all quintiles in simulation 2. Eligible households were thus allocated 
grants in accordance with their likelihood of receiving such grants in the survey. 
 
It is instructive to contrast these effects with those of doubling total spending on child grants 
through expanding the number of grants, but without improving targeting. The impact on poverty 
of such a scenario in 2003/2004 would have been almost exactly the same: a reduction of 3.1 
percent in the numbers in severe poverty and 1.2 percent in poverty, though the impact on the 
poverty severity measures is slightly larger (see Simulation 2 in Table 13). Again, a probit model 
containing demographic and other information on households was used to reallocate grants, but  
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this time to all quintiles, and again, eligible households were thus allocated grants in accordance 
with their likelihood of receiving such grants. Yet this second simulation would have required 
spending twice as much money on child grants as was the case at the time of the survey. A very 
similar effect on poverty could thus have been attained much more cheaply simply by ensuring 
that child grants were better targeted rather than through the more expensive option of expanding 
child grant coverage. In practice, the best of both worlds can be attained through both expanding 
coverage  of  social  grants  to  those  eligible,  and  improving  the  targeting  through  proper 
application of the means test.  
 
Table 14: Selected policy implications of the study 
 
  Develop  an  overarching  policy  for  social  protection,  which  should  also  define  more  clearly  the 
objectives of the cash transfer system, establish its development planning priority and set consistent 
targets. 
  Strengthen  coordination  and  capacity  among  implementers  to  avoid  double  payment  of  social 
pensions, subventions and grants, to improve means testing and strengthen uptake and delivery in 
hard to reach areas and to excluded social groups. 
  Determine the appropriate level and regular adjustment (through indexation) of the grants, which is 
likely to include a one-time upward adjustment to the level of the child grants to align these with other 
grant  types.  Medium  term  budgetary  safeguards  could  be  introduced  to  ensure  stability  in  the 
availability of fiscal resources for financing the cash transfer programme. 
  Reassess suitability of the means test for the maintenance grant specifically with its reference to the 
applicants‟ income rather than the socio-economic status of the household. 
  Reassess eligibility criteria for the maintenance grant notably the exclusion of poor and vulnerable 
children whose both parents are alive but who may be as needy as children who are currently eligible. 
  Explore alternatives to ex-ante means testing of old age pension e.g. using the tax system to claw 
back pension or penalize high-income recipients. 
  Investigate  the  true  administrative  costs  of  the  cash  transfer  system  to  further  assess  fiscal 
sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the system as a whole and in the options for means-testing.  
  Strengthen  M&E  and  invest  in  research  for  instance  on  the  impact  of  the  secondary  school 
conditionality, the large exclusion errors of the old age pension in certain regions (e.g. Erongo and 
Omaheke), the effects of social pensions and grants on labour force participation and other specific 
and general issues related to the cash transfer system. 
  Explore  alternative  social  protection  programmes  specifically  directed  towards  the  youth  and  the 
unemployed  such  as  public  works  programmes,  incentives  for  labour  hire  and  employment 
guarantees.  
  Redesign the household income and expenditure survey to better capture the incomes from social and 
private transfers, including cash grants and remittances. Also, involve stakeholders in social protection 
system in the design, execution and analysis of the survey.  
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On the basis of the discussion in this section a list of selected policy issues is compiled in Table 
14. The list is by no means exhaustive but covers a series of key issues that are particularly 
pertinent for consideration by the Namibian authorities as the system for social protection is 
reviewed within the context of the new National Development Plan and the cash transfer system 
expanded. Some of these issues are discussed further next in the conclusion of the study. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
The Namibian system of social cash transfers has its roots in South Africa, but has evolved quite 
differently given the different economic and social circumstances in these two countries resulting 
in a mix of eligibility criteria being applied. So for instance, the old-age pension in Namibia is 
not  means  tested  (unlike  in  South  Africa),  but  in  principle  the  child  grants  are.  Also,  the 
Namibian  child  grant  system  has  elements  of  conditionality  by  requiring  school  attendance 
records as documentation that the child is alive which some caregivers may regard as a signal 
that they are required to keep children at school. It may also lead to those not attending school to 
perceive  that  they  would  be  excluded  from  such  grants  and  thus  keep  them  from  applying. 
Certainly the provision of extending the grant beyond the 18
th to the 21
st year if the child attends 
secondary school serves as a more conventional conditionality. This is important and further 
evidence needs to be collected as to the uptake and effects of this feature of the grant. Raising 
secondary levels of education is of critical importance to Namibia: in 2001 only 46 percent of the 
candidates for the junior secondary school examination (grade 10), attained the minimum level 
required into grade 11 (World Bank 2005).  
 
Since 2003/2004 (the years of the NHIES), the number of grant recipients has increased rapidly. 
This is particularly true for the Foster Care Grant and Child Maintenance Grants which have 
seen a ten-fold increase between 2003 and 2008. Consequently, at present more than 12 percent 
of all Namibians are estimated to receive some type of social transfer. But while the number of 
grant recipients has unquestionably increased, the value of grants has not shown as clear a trend. 
The value of some grants (Old Age and Disability Pension and War Veterans Subvention) has 
increased in real terms since equalisation in the post-Independence period in the 1990s, but in  
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contrast the value of child grants and place of safety grants has declined. The nominal values of 
these grants have remained largely constant while inflation has eroded their real value. 
 
The NHIES 2003/2004 data has turned out to be a useful tool for studying the impact of grants 
on household welfare, which is not possible from official administrative data only and which has 
not been possible before in Namibia due to lack of data. There is broad consistency between the 
NHIES  and  administrative  sources  in  terms  of  both  the  aggregate  value  and  especially  the 
number of grant recipients, once one adjusts for cases where respondents clearly misunderstood 
the question on grants (e.g. the confusion between pensions from employment, and social old age 
pensions, or between maintenance payments or remittances and child grants for which generally 
only single orphans in the case of maintenance grants or double orphans in the case of foster 
grants are eligible). 
 
In the static framework used in the analysis social grants are found to lower the number of 
“poor”  individuals  (below  the  upper  bound  poverty  line)  by  10  percent.  For  “very  poor” 
individuals  the  impact  is  larger,  namely  a  22  percent  reduction.  Moreover,  use  of  the  FGT 
poverty measures shows that the grants matter more among the poorest of the poor. An analysis 
of the grants demonstrates that not only do they reduce poverty, but that there is a significant 
negative  correlation  between  severe  poverty  status  and  social  cash  transfers  even  after 
controlling for other factors that may play a role such as region, household structure, and the 
education level of the head of the household. In contrast to their substantial effect on poverty, 
social grants do not reduce overall levels of inequality much as inequality is affected more by the 
top incomes. This is important to bear in mind when reviewing the objectives and targets of the 
cash transfer system. These results are robust to specifications of household welfare that draws 
information from both the expenditure and income data of the household, although the analysis 
has shown that income data underestimates the welfare levels of the poorest, and are thus not 
particularly useful in the developing country context of Namibia. 
 
Despite the fact that the old age pension is universal, it is effectively targeted more at lower 
income households. Two factors play a role. Firstly, people of pension age are more often found 
in poorer households. Secondly, of those who are age-eligible for old age pensions, those among  
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the richer parts of the population are less likely to receive the pension, even though they qualify 
to get it as it is not means tested. This may be due to stigma and inconvenience: Higher income 
households may simply be less likely to apply for pensions than their poorer counterparts. It is 
important to note, though, that when this survey was undertaken there was still a substantial 
proportion of age-eligible persons at the lower end of the economic scale who did not receive the 
pensions, even though they qualified for it.  It is not clear whether they did not claim it, or 
whether administrative or other factors prevented them from obtaining it. There are some region-
specific  issues  related  to  these  errors  of  exclusion  that  are  particularly  worth  investigating 
further. 
 
Regarding the child grant, the survey shows that there are large errors of inclusion (non-poor 
households receiving such grants) and errors of exclusion (poor households with eligible children 
not  receiving  the  grant).  Though  the  grant  was  generally  targeted  at  the  poor,  as  the 
concentration curve shows, this largely happened because children generally, and single and 
double orphans in particular, were more likely to find themselves in poor households. There is 
however little evidence that the poorer amongst them are more likely to receive grants than the 
less poor, i.e. it appears as if the means test in its current form is not effective as a mechanism for 
targeting. 
 
A debate about the system of social cash transfers in Namibia seems warranted especially if it 
conducted within the context of reforming social protection more broadly. Such a debate will 
invariably also touch on the prospects of expanding the social grants system to cover all citizens 
in the form of a Basic Income Grant, as proposed by a coalition of churches and civil society 
organisations. Moreover, clearly other options exists for extending social protection mechanisms 
to those currently uncovered, most notably the unemployed youth, e.g. through public works 
programmes, labour-hire incentives, and employment guarantees. However, the main focus of 
this paper has been to highlight the important role of the current system of social cash transfers, 
which is making a substantial and growing contribution to poverty reduction in the country, and 
to provide some specific suggestions on how to make that system work better.  
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Annex A: Definitions of income and expenditure 
 
 
1. Adult equivalence scale (adeq) 
Age:  0-5 years  Weight = 0.5 
              Age:  6-15 years  Weight = 0.75 
              Age:  16+ years  Weight = 1 
             
  2. Household income 
 
Regular income (Excluding deductions by employer) 
              +  Other household income 
                =  Household income 
               
 
* Per capita income = household income / hhsize 
             
 
* Per adult equivalent income = household income / adeq 
           
  3. Revised household income 
 
Regular income (Excluding deductions by employer) 
              +  Other household income 
                +  Produce 
                +  Livestock 
                -  Input cost 
                -  Net withdrawals from savings 
                -  Deductions by employer 
                =  Revised household income 
               
 
* Revised per capita income = revised household income / hhsize 
           
 
* Revised per adult equivalent income = revised household income / adeq 
         
  4. Household expenditure 
 
Consumption: Food/Beverages/Tobacco/Narcotics 
              +  Consumption: Clothing/Footwear 
                +  Consumption: Housing/Water/Electricity/Gas and other fuels 
              +  Consumption: Furnishings/Household equipment/Household maintenance 
          +  Consumption: Health 
                +  Consumption: Transport 
                +  Consumption: Communication 
                +  Consumption: Recreation/Culture 
                +  Consumption: Education 
                +  Consumption: Restaurants/Hotels 
                +  Consumption: Micellaneous goods and services 
              =  Household expenditure 
               
 
* Per capita expenditure = household expenditure / hhsize 
           
 
* Per adult equivalent expenditure = household expenditure / adeq 
         
              5. Hybrid of expenditure/income 
=  Highest value of either expenditure or income 
         
 
* Per capita hybrid = hybrid of expenditure and income / hhsize 
         
 
* Per adult equivalent hybrid = hybrid of expenditure and income / adeq 
           
 